摘要： With the integration of product and services, maintenance strategy is transitioning from time- and material-based operation to performance-based contracting. This paradigm shift enables the supplier to maximize the service profit by attaining the system performance goal, while the customer can lower the asset ownership cost with ensured system availability. A main challenge in implement a performance-based maintenance program has to do with the so-called moral hazard issue in which one player is more likely to take risks because the resulting costs are borne by the other. We propose a multi-criteria, multi-item maintenance model to maximize the utilities of all the stakeholders. The goals are achieved by optimizing maintenance time, spares inventory, and repair capacity under principal-agent game framework. We prove that the actions of the supplier and the customer are fully observable among each other. Hence a first-best solution is guaranteed without moral hazard issue. Numerical studies from wind industry show that a single multi-item contract could be advantageous over multiple single-item contracts as it ensures a higher profit "justify"> 

报告人简介：Dr. Tongdan Jin is an Associate Professor in The Ingram School of Engineering at Texas State University. Prior to academia, he held a reliability engineer position for five years in Teradyne Inc., Boston. He obtained his Ph.D. in Industrial and Systems Engineering from Rutgers University. His MS and BS degrees in engineering are, respectively, obtained from Beijing Institute of Technology and Shaanxi University of Science Technology, China. He has authored and co-authored many papers published in IEEE Transactions on Reliability, European Journal of Operational Research, and International Journal of Production Economics, among others. He is a recipient of Evans-McElroy best conference paper in Reliability and Maintainability Symposium in 2014. His current research topics include reliability modeling and optimization, and low-carbon supply chain design.